


This article was downloaded by: [University of California, Berkeley]

On: 14 December 2010

Access details: Access Details: [subscription number 929586225]

Publisher Routledge

Informa Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number: 1072954 Registered office: Mortimer House, 37-41 Mortimer Street, London W1T 3JH, UK



Comparative Strategy

Publication details, including instructions for authors and subscription information:

<http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/title~content=t713769613>

Taking Soft Power Seriously

Matthew Kroenig^a; Melissa McAdam^b; Steven Weber^c

^a Department of Government, Georgetown University, Washington, DC, USA ^b Department of Political Science, University of California, Berkeley, Berkeley, California, USA ^c Information School, University of California, Berkeley, Berkeley, California, USA

Online publication date: 13 December 2010

To cite this Article Kroenig, Matthew , McAdam, Melissa and Weber, Steven(2010) 'Taking Soft Power Seriously', Comparative Strategy, 29: 5, 412 – 431

To link to this Article: DOI: 10.1080/01495933.2010.520986

URL: <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/01495933.2010.520986>

PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE

Full terms and conditions of use: <http://www.informaworld.com/terms-and-conditions-of-access.pdf>

This article may be used for research, teaching and private study purposes. Any substantial or systematic reproduction, re-distribution, re-selling, loan or sub-licensing, systematic supply or distribution in any form to anyone is expressly forbidden.

The publisher does not give any warranty express or implied or make any representation that the contents will be complete or accurate or up to date. The accuracy of any instructions, formulae and drug doses should be independently verified with primary sources. The publisher shall not be liable for any loss, actions, claims, proceedings, demand or costs or damages whatsoever or howsoever caused arising directly or indirectly in connection with or arising out of the use of this material.

Taking Soft Power Seriously

MATTHEW KROENIG

Department of Government
Georgetown University
Washington, DC, USA

MELISSA McADAM

Department of Political Science
University of California, Berkeley
Berkeley, California, USA

STEVEN WEBER

Information School
University of California, Berkeley
Berkeley, California, USA

The term soft power is entrenched in the theory and practice of American foreign policy, yet scholars have not yet developed, or empirically tested, a theory about the conditions under which governments can use soft power to their advantage—and that makes good policy hard to design. Drawing on research from the fields of communications, social psychology, and international relations theory, we develop a theory about the conditions under which state efforts to employ soft power will be most likely to succeed. We argue that to apply soft power effectively states must communicate to an intended target in a functioning marketplace of ideas, persuade the target to change its attitude on a relevant political issue, and ensure that the target's newly held attitude influences international political outcomes. We probe the plausibility of our theoretical claims through an examination of U.S. attempts to use soft power in the Iraq War, the war on terror, and democracy promotion. In conclusion, we set forth an agenda for future research on soft power and provide insights for policymakers interested in using soft power as a tool of foreign policy.

In his 1990 book *Bound to Lead*, Joseph Nye introduced the concept of “soft power.”¹ According to Nye, soft power is “getting others to want the outcomes that you want.”² Unlike hard power that encourages changes in behavior through either inducements or threats, Nye argues that soft power “comes from attraction.”³ Relevant hard-power resources include military and economic might, but the soft power of a country “rests primarily on three sources: its culture (in places where it is attractive to others), its political values (when it lives up to them at home and abroad), and its foreign policies (when they are seen as legitimate and having moral authority).”⁴ Nye argues that the culture, values, and policies of the United States, in particular, have historically been very attractive to the rest of the world and that this has provided the United States with a reservoir of soft power that it

For helpful comments on earlier drafts of this article, the authors would like to thank Celeste Arrington, Naaz Barma, Brent Durbin, Peter Katzenstein, David Patel, Ely Ratner, Jacob Shapiro, and the participants in the American Soft Power Panel at the 2008 International Studies Association annual meeting held in San Francisco, California.

can use to achieve its goals without resorting to bribery or coercion.⁵ Nye cites numerous cases, including the fall of the Soviet Union, as examples in which the United States used soft power to its advantage.⁶

Nye's claims about the importance of soft power have had an enormous impact on the theory and practice of American foreign policy. Scholars have adopted the concept in their academic writings, pundits have advocated that the United States use more or less soft power in its mix of foreign policy strategies, analysts have attempted to size up the soft power of other states, and policymakers have pursued policies that assume that soft power is an important force in international politics.⁷

Yet this is all taking place without any real agreement on what soft power actually means, precisely how it works, and what it takes to deploy it effectively. While there is a voluminous literature on soft power, scholars have not articulated, in a practical sense, how governments can use soft power to their advantage, nor have they theorized the conditions under which soft power campaigns will be most likely to succeed.⁸

In this article, we develop a theory about the conditions under which governmental efforts to employ soft power will be most likely to succeed. We define a state effort to employ soft power as a coordinated government attempt to convince other actors to do what they otherwise would not do by using instruments that do not directly affect the others' material incentive structure.⁹ In other words, states exercise soft power when they use nonmaterial means to achieve specific foreign policy objectives. It is of course the case that states do not control some resources, such as national culture, that are thought to be an important part of the broader definitions of soft power and could be resources in a soft power strategy. For this reason, recommendations for governments to use more or less soft power in their foreign policy portfolios are at odds with expansive notions of soft power that include resources governments cannot readily control.¹⁰ We invite others to analyze in future research the more expansive notions of soft power.

In this piece, we analyze government efforts to employ soft power to achieve specific foreign policy goals. This research question is most amenable to political analysis and promises to provide useful policy recommendations.

Drawing on research from the fields of communications, social psychology, and international relations theory, we argue that there are a number of steps that intervene between a state's effort to exercise soft power and an improvement in its foreign policy environment. To apply soft power effectively states must: communicate to an intended target in a functioning marketplace of ideas, persuade the target to change its attitude on a relevant political issue, and ensure that the target's newly held attitude influences international political outcomes. Each of these conditions is necessary, but when taken together may or may not be sufficient for a state to effectively employ soft power.

We probe the plausibility of our theoretical claims against evidence from U.S. attempts to use soft power in the post-9/11 era. This preliminary empirical investigation lends plausibility to our theoretical claims. The absence of soft power's three preconditions contributed to the United States' failure to win hearts and minds in Iraq and to counter ideological support for terrorism, but their presence helped Washington promote democracy in the postcommunist region.

The findings of this article have important implications for scholarly research and U.S. foreign policy. Although "power" is still a contested concept, scholars have invested enormous effort in developing theories of how to deploy hard power in the service of state interests. If soft power is even a fraction as important as hard power is, or could be, then it seems straightforward that scholars should invest real effort in developing analogous theories of soft power. As a partial move in that direction, we provide a set of criteria for

determining the types of policy problems that states may be able to successfully address using soft power strategies.

In the next section, we present a theory about the conditions under which state soft power campaigns will be most likely to succeed. We then analyze three U.S. government efforts to employ soft power—the Iraq War, the war on terror, and democracy promotion—to assess the plausibility of our theoretical model. Finally, in the concluding section, we highlight implications of our argument for international relations theory and U.S. foreign policy.

Toward a Theory of Soft Power

In this section, we develop a theory about the conditions under which states will best be able to apply soft power to achieve specific foreign policy objectives. We argue that there are a number of hurdles that intervene between a state's attempt to wield soft power and its ability to achieve its desired outcomes in international politics. If soft power is an important force in international politics, and if states are to wield soft power as a tool of diplomacy, then there are three preconditions that should characterize the environment in which states operate. First, states must be able to communicate to the intended target in something approximating a functioning marketplace of ideas. Second, the attitudes of the relevant target must be subject to influence and change. Third, the attitudes of the target must have causal impact on an outcome in international politics that promotes the interests of the state attempting to wield soft power. We argue that each of these three conditions are necessary, but may not be sufficient, for a state to effectively employ soft power.

Marketplace of Ideas

If states are to shape the preferences of an international audience, or target, then they must be able to interact with that target in something that functions like a marketplace of ideas. It is only in such a marketplace that the wielder of soft power or the “sender” can shape the preferences of others. At the other extreme, if the target is never exposed to the sender's message, then it obviously cannot be influenced by it. If the target is exposed to the sender's message only in a context that systematically portrays the message as unattractive, and the sender has no opportunity to correct that bias, it will also be unlikely that the target will adjust its preferences to the advantage of the potential wielder of soft power.

The sine qua non of a functioning economic marketplace is competition. A functioning marketplace of ideas also requires competition. There is market failure when the competition of ideas breaks down, undermining efforts to deploy soft power. When national governments attempt to control the content of information flows to, and within, their societies, they can exert a systematic influence on the beliefs of their people, masses and elites alike. Governments shape the messages received by their populace for reasons of domestic legitimacy and regime survival, but the sometimes unintended consequence is undermining the soft power of other states. This can be done as authoritarian states selectively permit information from abroad to enter. This can also be done through official government propaganda that intentionally seeks to tarnish the policies, culture, and values of other states. In such an environment, the competition of ideas takes place on an uneven playing field and it will be more difficult for the disadvantaged states to exercise soft power.

In sum, states wishing to exercise soft power will be more successful in an environment with a functioning marketplace of ideas. In case of market failure due to government censorship, or other barriers, steps to overcome the market failure may be necessary before soft power can be effectively exercised.

Attitude Change

Assuming that a potential wielder of soft power is able to effectively communicate its message to an intended target, its work is not yet done. In order to influence the target, at a bare minimum, the message must result in a change of attitude. Psychological research suggests that changing strongly held attitudes is most likely to occur under certain conditions.

An attitude is defined as “a general and enduring positive or negative feeling about some person, object, or issue.”¹¹ Persuasion is “any instance in which an active attempt is made to change a person’s mind.”¹² According to psychological research, the probability of attitude change is determined by three factors—the source of the message, the content of the message, and the recipient of the message.¹³ When a source is credible and attractive, a message is repeated and contains emotional content, and the target is in a receptive mood, attitudinal change is more likely.¹⁴

Persuasion is more likely to be successful if the recipient of the message deems the source to be credible and attractive.¹⁵ Credible sources are identified as those that are expert and trustworthy.¹⁶ Research shows that the trustworthiness of a source is undermined if the source has a direct stake in the matter at hand, especially when the source promotes a position that clearly furthers his or her own interests.¹⁷ Because of this, independent, third-party sources are often better able to convey a credible message.

Attractive sources are also persuasive because research shows that people want to please sources that they like.¹⁸ There may be limits, however, to the persuasive power of beauty when it comes to substantial political issues. Experimental research has found that messages delivered by an attractive woman are more likely to encourage a change in attitude on trivial issues, such as switching toothpaste.¹⁹ In short, expert, trustworthy, and attractive sources are more credible, and thus more persuasive, than nonexpert, untrustworthy, and/or unattractive sources.

The message itself, in particular its frequency and content, is also an important factor in determining the effectiveness of persuasion. Repetition of a message enhances comprehension and retention. The more often the target of an intended message receives the message, the more likely it is that he or she will remember it.²⁰ Yet at a certain point, repeated presentations of a persuasive message decrease attitude change while simultaneously increasing retention.²¹ The content of a message also matters. Messages that arouse or reduce strongly felt emotions such as fear are more likely to be retained.²²

Finally, factors associated with the messages’ intended target also determine the degree to which the recipient will internalize the message. People who have low self-esteem are most likely to be influenced by persuasive communication.²³ The target’s experience prior to receiving a message also matters. People in a good mood are more open to persuasion.²⁴ For example, experiments show that people eating delectable foods while reading a message are more likely to be receptive to that message.²⁵

The implications of the psychological literature on attitudinal change for soft power are complicated and cannot be ignored. States seeking to shape the preferences of other actors will be more effective insofar as their efforts are consistent with basic psychological laws of attitude change. State efforts to apply soft power are more likely to meet with success when they communicate through credible and attractive sources, deliver a repeated

message that speaks to the recipient at an emotional level, and target recipients that are open to communication.

Attitudes and Foreign Policy

Even if a state is successful in effectively communicating a message in a marketplace of ideas and in changing the attitudes of its target audience, the state will not have applied soft power effectively if the new attitude does not result in a noticeable improvement in the state's international political environment. Any theory of soft power necessarily assumes that attitudes held by individuals play a central causal role in determining political behavior and that the behavior of these individuals can shape relevant international outcomes. There are reasons to believe, however, that the attitudes of individuals may have a decisive impact on international political outcomes only under certain conditions. Individuals may not be in a position to influence international political outcomes themselves and, even if they are, structural and material forces compete with and shape individual attitudes as a driver of international political outcomes. States will be better able to exercise soft power when they target relevant political actors and when the attitudes held by these actors are not challenged by competing material forces.

The application of soft power is more likely to succeed when the target of the soft power campaign is in a position to shape international political outcomes. According to some international relations scholars, individuals are rarely in such a position.²⁶ There are, however, certain types of individuals and certain types of issue areas in which individuals may have a greater ability to shape political outcomes, depending on the type of state in which they reside. In most states, elites have a greater voice in influencing their state's foreign policy than does the average citizen. In open polities, the voice of the average citizen may count for more in shaping his or her state's foreign policy than in a state ruled by an authoritarian regime. In a few select issue areas, such as terrorism, insurgency, or civil war, the individual is an important political actor in his or her own right. A soft power campaign directed at these politically relevant actors is more likely to be effective than a campaign that targets actors that are unlikely to have any role in shaping national foreign policies, or in directly acting in an international political context.

Even if a wielder of soft power is successful at changing the attitude of a relevant political actor, however, individual attitudes may still be overwhelmed by material and structural factors in driving international political outcomes. If the message of the soft power campaign clashes with material interests of the target audience, whether that target is a state or a substate actor, it is less likely that the attitude will shape the target's political behavior. If, on the other hand, the message expressed in the soft power campaign is consistent, or at least not in direct conflict, with the target's core material interests, or if the target does not possess a clear understanding of its core material interests, the soft power campaign stands a greater chance of success.

In sum, we propose that attitude change will be more likely to result in a change in the international political environment when states target relevant political actors and when the message of the soft power campaign does not conflict with the target audience's core material interests.

Summary: A Theory of Soft Power

Drawing on previous research from the fields of communications, psychology, and international relations theory, this section described the path by which soft power operates. States

will be better able to apply soft power when three conditions are present—1) the intended target exists in a functioning marketplace of ideas, 2) the state can communicate through a credible source that can deliver a repeated message that speaks to recipients at an emotional level and the target is open to communication, 3) the political environment is such that individual attitudes have an impact. These conditions are fairly restrictive and suggest that the scope for the successful application of soft power in international politics may be more limited than is generally thought.

Soft Power in Practice

To probe the plausibility of this theory of soft power, we examine soft power campaigns waged by the United States in the post 9/11 era under the leadership of President George W. Bush: winning hearts and minds in Iraq, countering ideological support for terrorism, and democracy promotion in the postcommunist region.

The selection of these three cases offers an important advantage for our research question and hypotheses. By selecting cases from a single state, at a delimited point in time, simultaneously engaged in a number of soft power campaigns, we control roughly for the aggregate soft power resources of the state and other potentially confounding factors related to the state (including its leadership) and the historical time period. This allows us to examine how changes in the hypothesized conditions influences the probability that a soft power campaign will succeed. If, in these cases, the United States experienced varying degrees of success, and this variation was due in part to the conditions we identify above, we will have found some support for our argument.

We study what are arguably the three most prominent soft power campaigns directed at particular audiences and aimed at defined outcomes that the United States has conducted since 9/11.²⁷ It is possible that some soft power campaigns succeed and others fail because the government devoted more attention and resources to some soft power campaigns than to others. By focusing only on the most important soft power campaigns, we can increase our confidence that any difference in outcomes can be explained by the conditions we identify, and that those differences are not primarily the result of different levels of government effort or the commitment of resources.

We also recognize that focusing on a single presidential administration in a single country limits our ability to generalize our findings. It may very well be the case that other countries, or other U.S. presidential administrations, apply soft power more or less effectively than did the George W. Bush administration. Therefore, this research design does not allow us to draw any definitive conclusions on the overall effectiveness of soft power strategies.

We examine carefully the effectiveness of the U.S. soft power campaigns in each of these cases through the lens of our theoretical argument. We seek to understand the degree to which the U.S. soft power campaign had an effect in each of these cases. We do not contend that a soft power story can definitively explain lack of support for the U.S. occupation in Iraq, the strength of international terrorist ideology, and successful democratization in a single article. Many factors other than the application of U.S. soft power helped to generate the observed outcomes in each case. Our goal is a more modest one, to assess the impact, if any, produced by the U.S. soft power campaign in each policy domain.

States often apply hard power and soft power in tandem. In the analysis of soft power campaigns that follow we seek to isolate and evaluate the effectiveness of the soft power campaign in isolation. We measure the success or failure of the U.S. soft power campaigns in each of these cases by examining the goals of the campaign as stated by the U.S.

government. When we find evidence that a U.S. soft power campaign made noticeable progress toward its stated goals, the case is scored as a soft power success. On the other hand, when we find that the U.S. soft power campaign failed to make evident progress toward its stated goals, the case is scored as a failure.

Iraq War

In the Iraq War, the United States set out to use soft power to win the hearts and minds of the Iraqi public. Despite a concerted effort, the United States failed in this objective and a vast majority of Iraqis turned against the U.S.-led occupation. We argue that this failure was the result of an environment that was not conducive to the application of soft power. While Iraq did contain a functioning marketplace of ideas, the United States was unable to persuade Iraqis because the United States lacked credibility as a messenger. Moreover, the U.S. occupation clashed with the core material interests of the Iraqi people.

The importance of winning hearts and minds was evident in government rhetoric and action.²⁸ The U.S. government took a number of concrete steps designed to gain the approval of the Iraqi people. The U.S. military launched an information campaign that included the writing and planting of media stories chronicling the good that the U.S. occupation was doing for Iraqi society.²⁹ The U.S. Army's National Training Center in California was transformed from holding Cold War-style tank-on-tank war games to hosting mock Iraqi villages that provided soldiers experience in mingling with and winning over a civilian population.³⁰ Most importantly, in 2007 the United States "surged" the number of U.S. forces in Iraq to better provide population security as dictated by a new counterterrorism strategy.

Despite a clear recognition of the importance of soft power in Iraq, and a concerted effort to win the hearts and minds of the Iraqi public, the United States failed. In the years following the U.S. invasion, Iraqi popular approval of the U.S. military occupation steadily declined. In a 2008 poll, for example, 61 percent of Iraqis said that the presence of U.S. forces provoked more violence than it prevented.³¹ Support for attacks against U.S. troops increased from 47 percent in January 2006 to 61 percent in June 2006.³² And finally, of Iraqis who said that the country is moving in the wrong direction, 32 percent cited the presence of the occupation as a reason in June 2006, up from 17 percent in September 2005.³³ Not even the U.S.'s new counterinsurgency policy in 2006 and the associated surge in the level of U.S. forces in Iraq in 2007 succeeded in winning over the Iraqi population. Only 26 percent of Iraqis agreed that the surge had succeeded, and over half said that it had made the security situation in Iraq worse.³⁴ In short, in the face of a concerted U.S. effort to win over the Iraqi people, Iraqi public opinion on the U.S. mission in Iraq deteriorated over time.

Why did the United States fail to win the hearts and minds of the Iraqi public?³⁵ The answer is that the conditions for the application of soft power were never in place in the Iraqi case. The United States was able to communicate in something approximating a functioning marketplace of ideas in Iraq, but it was unable to exert soft power because conditions were not conducive to persuasion, and because the message of the U.S. soft power campaign clashed with the core interests of the Iraqi people.

The U.S. effort to apply soft power in Iraq was able to access a fairly robust marketplace of ideas. Following the overthrow of Saddam Hussein's regime, Iraq was exposed, for the first time in decades, to a relatively open media and freewheeling political debate. Iraqis suddenly had a choice among newspapers. The number of available print media proliferated from a few tightly-controlled outlets prior to the invasion to more than 100 newspapers

and magazines that were made available within years in Baghdad.³⁶ Iraqis were also able to gain access to satellite television and foreign news services including Al Jazeera, Al Arabiya, CNN, and the BBC.³⁷ By 2007, seventy percent of Iraqis had satellite television in their homes.³⁸ The evidence suggests that mainstream Iraqis had fairly open access to a range of ideas in the post-invasion environment.

The United States actively attempted to compete in this marketplace of ideas. U.S. civilian and military leaders appeared on television and radio speaking about the benign intentions and potential benefits of the U.S. occupation.³⁹ Iraqi leaders themselves spoke out in public on behalf of the U.S. occupation.⁴⁰ This was, however, a marketplace, not a monopoly, of ideas and many others denounced the U.S. role in Iraq. Foreign officials, members of the Iraqi government, Shiite clerics, al Qaeda leaders, opposition groups in the United States, and others publicly accused the United States of being a self-interested imperial power and urged an immediate transfer of sovereignty to Iraq and the redeployment of U.S. forces.⁴¹ The Iraqi population had a range of products from which to choose in this new ideational marketplace.

While the United States was able to compete in the marketplace of ideas, the circumstances were not conducive to persuasion. Research has shown that self-interested actors make less credible messengers, and the United States had clearly self-interested motivations to convince the Iraqi public of the benefits of U.S. occupation. Iraqis were skeptical of U.S. messages from the beginning of the occupation. According to one Iraqi educator, speaking in the summer of 2004, the Iraqis “just don’t believe the Americans anymore.”⁴² Even attempts to conceal the American hand were largely unsuccessful. The fact that the U.S. was writing media content for an Iraqi audience was revealed in a *New York Times* exposé. The story was met with “shrugs” in Baghdad, where people were already “skeptical about the media.”⁴³ The absence of independent, third-party sources of the message that the U.S. occupation was beneficial to Iraq was striking and had a significant impact on Iraqis’ lack of support for the occupation.

Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the U.S. efforts to use soft power to win hearts and minds in Iraq also failed because support for the U.S.-led occupation clashed with the core material interests of the Iraqi population. Simply put, the U.S. occupation was in direct conflict with Iraq’s core material interest of regaining control of its lost sovereignty.

Successful occupations are characterized by and are partly a result of a significant external security threat shared by both the occupied population and the occupying power.⁴⁴ In the Iraq case, the United States could not claim to be defending Iraq from an even greater foreign threat, and the Iraqi population was not convinced that a long-term U.S. military presence was necessary. As a result, and as the polling data show, the Iraqi people were hostile to U.S. forces from the beginning of the occupation and their resistance only increased as the U.S. military presence persisted. It is, of course, the case that Iraqi political actors were sometimes willing to enter into short-term alliances with U.S. forces. But such relationships, as that between the tribes and U.S. forces, were marriages of convenience; they never dented Iraqi opposition to the U.S. military presence. For example, in a September 2006 poll, conducted nearly a year after cooperation with Sunni tribal leaders in Anbar began, 98 percent of Sunni Arabs said that they had little no or little confidence in the U.S. military.⁴⁵ And, 91 percent of Sunni Arabs said they wanted U.S. troops out of Iraq within one year.⁴⁶

With hindsight it is obvious that the United States could have done better in its attempt to win Iraqi hearts and minds. The prisoner abuse scandal at Abu Ghraib and the initial U.S. counterinsurgency strategy that focused on searching and destroying insurgents alienated much of the Iraqi population. Yet, it is unlikely that U.S. efforts to win hearts and minds

could have been successful even with a more thoughtful prisoner policy and a better counterinsurgency strategy from the beginning.

By 2008, with widespread public support, the Iraqi government negotiated a final status of forces agreement with the United States. The agreement required U.S. combat forces to withdraw from Iraqi cities by the close of June 2009 and for all U.S. forces to withdraw from Iraq by 2010 or 2011. In the words of David Edelstein, "Foreign military occupation is incongruous with the goals of a national group to govern itself."⁴⁷ No amount of U.S. soft power could have convinced the Iraqi people to abandon their desire to exercise sovereignty.

In sum, the U.S. occupation in Iraq was not a situation conducive to the application of soft power. The United States was able to compete in a functioning marketplace of ideas in Iraq, but U.S. messages lacked credibility and contradicted the core interests of the Iraqi people, undermining the effectiveness of U.S. soft power policies.

The War on Terror

The United States has also sought to apply soft power to counter ideological support for terrorism. Again, despite a concerted effort by the United States, global support for terrorist ideology shows no sign of abating and, according to some measures, may be increasing. The inability of the United States to counter ideological support for terrorism can be attributed to an environment hostile to the application of soft power. The societies and groups to which the United States has targeted its message largely lack functioning marketplaces of ideas and the U.S. message is not credible to the target audience. For these reasons, the application of soft power has been an ineffective tool for countering ideological support for terrorism, despite the importance of individual attitudes as a driver of terrorist behavior.

In the 2005 National Defense Strategy, the United States presented a three-pronged strategy for winning the war on terror.⁴⁸ The first two elements of the strategy, attacking terrorist networks and defending the homeland, were definitively in the realm of hard power. The third and, according to many Pentagon officials, the most important element of the strategy was "countering ideological support for terrorism."⁴⁹ As part of this soft power strategy, the United States declared its intent to "Support models of moderation in the Muslim world by helping change Muslim misperceptions of the United States and the West."⁵⁰ According to the 2006 National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, "winning the War on Terror means winning the battle of ideas."⁵¹

A special task force on "strategic communications" was set up at the Defense Science Board that argued, "the United States is engaged in a generational and global struggle about ideas."⁵² Under the leadership of Karen Hughes as Undersecretary of State for Public Diplomacy, the State Department established regional media hubs offering U.S. spokespeople with foreign language skills to speak on America's behalf in media outlets throughout the Middle East.⁵³ The United States government also increased the budget for the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), the U.S. agency responsible for dispensing foreign aid, by 60 percent, from 5 billion in 1998 to 8 billion in 2003.⁵⁴ The United States funded a variety of pro-American media in the Muslim world, including *HI* magazine, Radio Sawa, and the Al Hurra television station.⁵⁵ Furthermore, the United States established reeducation facilities, such as the "House of Wisdom" in Iraq, to teach moderate Muslim theology to detainees captured in the war on terror.⁵⁶

Despite this widespread effort to communicate throughout the Muslim world, the United States largely failed in its effort to apply soft power to its advantage in the war on terror by the end of the Bush administration. The war on terror will probably be a "generational struggle," but it is nevertheless troubling that after a sustained multiyear

effort to counter ideological support for terrorism, the United States made real progress on very few of its stated objectives. The United States, since 9/11, avoided a major terrorist attack, and while the causes of this can be debated, it is not likely the result of a waning of terrorist ideology globally, as is evidenced by the string of attacks in other parts of the world.⁵⁷ Terrorist ideology continued to flourish globally with the help of the internet.⁵⁸ The low public opinion of the United States in the Muslim world, often thought to be one of the factors contributing to terrorism against the United States and its allies, did not improve by the end of the Bush administration. In fact, a 2006 study found that people's "attitudes toward U.S. foreign policy actually worsened slightly since they started listening to Radio *Sawa* and *Al Hurra*."⁵⁹ The U.S. failure to use soft power effectively in the war on terror was severely pronounced in some of the most important countries. In Egypt and Pakistan, for example, 60 percent and 41 percent of their respective publics possessed either positive or mixed views of al Qaeda in 2006.⁶⁰ According to Doug Miller, chairman of the international polling firm Globescan, "The fact that so many people in Egypt and Pakistan have mixed or even positive views of al Qaeda is yet another indicator that the US war on terror is not winning hearts and minds."⁶¹

Why did the United States fail in its effort to use soft power to counter ideological support for terrorism? Part of the reason was that the United States was not able to compete in a functioning marketplace of ideas in most of the societies where a threat of jihadi terrorism exists. In the 2006 *National Strategy for Combating Terrorism*, the United States acknowledges that "terrorists recruit more effectively from populations whose information about the world is contaminated by falsehoods and corrupted by conspiracy theories. The distortions keep alive grievances and filter out facts that would challenge popular prejudices and self-serving propaganda."⁶² In other words, many countries of the Middle East and the broader Muslim world lack a functioning marketplace of ideas. They are disproportionately authoritarian.⁶³ These governments often take measures, generally for the purposes of domestic stability, that have the effect of preventing meaningful competition in their domestic marketplaces of ideas. Foreign media content containing ideas about democracy and freedom is filtered.⁶⁴ Radical religious groups, extremist parties, and fundamentalist madrassas are supported to shore up the legitimacy of secular regimes.⁶⁵ Domestic problems are externalized and blamed on an "imperial" United States.⁶⁶ The lack of a functioning marketplace of ideas in this region contributes to the pervasiveness of conspiracy theories.⁶⁷ Due in part to these phenomena, public opinion of U.S. foreign policy in 2005 was lower in the Middle East than in any other world region.⁶⁸ The inability of the United States to communicate in this region is aptly described by Norman Patizz, an American media entrepreneur, who notes that "there is a media war going on [in the Muslim world] with incitement, hate broadcasting, disinformation, government censorship, self-censorship, and America is not in the race."⁶⁹

Another limiting factor on the United States' effort to counter ideological support for terrorism is the logic of persuasion. U.S. efforts to communicate directly with the Muslim world were thwarted by a lack of credibility. Expert messengers are more persuasive than nonexperts, but U.S. government officials are hardly qualified to discuss the intricacies of Muslim theology and the consistency, or lack thereof, of terrorism with the teachings of the Koran. U.S. strategists have recognized this and sought to adjust strategy appropriately, aiming to communicate through surrogates whenever possible.⁷⁰ Attempts to channel a message in this way can be vastly self-defeating, however, when surrogates are revealed to be non-independent third parties. For example, audiences in the Middle East generally know which media outlets receive U.S. support and, accordingly, discount the messages that they receive from those sources. According to *Al-Ahram Weekly*, an Egyptian newspaper,

Arab youth listen to Radio *Sawa*, a U.S. funded media outlet, but “they take the U.S. sound and discard the U.S. agenda.”⁷¹

In the war on terror, individual attitudes have had an important, though mixed, effect on international political outcomes. Ideas have a critical (but by no means exclusive) impact on individual decisions to join a terrorist organization. Exposure to radical ideology is an important component leading an individual to become a terrorist. While containing an undeniable ideological component, however, many of the factors that convince people to turn to terrorism are material in origin, not ideational, and thus cannot be addressed with soft power tools. Social science research suggests that many factors may contribute to the production of a terrorist. Few opportunities for political participation, low levels of social integration, personal loss, and foreign occupation are among the variables that have been linked to a higher risk of terrorism.⁷² The United States can combat some of these risk factors through the application or withdrawal of hard power, but few of them can be addressed through the application of soft power alone.

The United States was largely unsuccessful in its attempt to use soft power to counter global ideological support for terrorism. This failure was due, at least in part, to the absence of the conditions necessary for an effective soft power strategy. Attitudes may be influential in determining the strength of the international terrorist movement, but the United States was unable to participate in debates in key regions in which terrorist ideology flourishes and a lack of credibility further hindered U.S. efforts to change attitudes on important terrorism-related issues.

Democracy Promotion

The United States has also attempted to use soft power to promote the spread of democracy around the globe. Unlike in the other two issue areas, the U.S. democracy promotion campaigns met with some success as evidenced by a spate of electoral revolutions in the postcommunist region. We argue that the successful influence of these U.S. democracy promotion efforts is due to the presence of the necessary conditions for an effective soft power campaign. In the countries that experienced electoral revolutions, there was a functioning marketplace of ideas, the United States identified and supported credible messengers to transmit ideas about democratization, and ideas about the best practices for bringing down authoritarian regimes could significantly impact the outcome.

In recent years, the United States has devoted a disproportionate amount of its democracy promotion attention to the postcommunist region. The proportion of countries receiving USAID democracy assistance, and the duration of time over which the countries receive assistance, are higher in the postcommunist region than in other world regions. A survey of USAID funding from 1990–2003 “reveals that the postcommunist region stands out as a clear priority for USAID with respect to democracy assistance.”⁷³ Other U.S. government-funded democracy promotion organizations such as the National Endowment for Democracy have similarly concentrated their resources on the postcommunist region.

The U.S.’s soft power strategies aimed at promoting democracy in the postcommunist world since the end of the Cold War have met with notable success. The rate of electoral revolutions in this region has been staggering. According to a recent study, “pivotal elections that have either enhanced or introduced democracy have taken place in eight countries, or 40 percent of the twenty postcommunist countries that remained eligible for such revolutions.”⁷⁴ The well-publicized “color revolutions” swept through Georgia (The Rose Revolution, 2003), Ukraine (The Orange Revolution, 2004), and Kyrgyzstan (The Tulip Revolution, 2005).

The available studies on the wave of electoral revolutions in the postcommunist region all identify American democracy promotion efforts as an important contributing cause of these revolutions, and some scholars go so far as to argue that the revolutions were significantly engineered by the United States.⁷⁵ For example, in a recent study on Ukraine's Orange Revolution, Michael McFaul writes that the ideas and resources provided by the United States and other external actors "did play a direct, causal role in constraining some dimensions of autocratic power and enhancing some dimensions of the opposition's power."⁷⁶ The United States invested in opposition, media, and civil society groups, signaled their displeasure with incumbent authoritarian regimes, and intervened to prevent incumbent regimes from stealing elections.⁷⁷

Of course, the spate of democratization cannot reasonably be attributed to U.S. democracy promotion efforts alone. Favorable domestic conditions as well as other sources of international support played an important role in bringing down dictators. Still, the available evidence indicates that without America's soft power campaign to spread democracy to this region, it is probable that at least some of the electoral revolutions would not have occurred. As such, democracy promotion is best scored as a case of soft power success.

Why was the U.S. soft power campaign to promote democracy in the region more successful than similar campaigns in the Iraq War and the war on terror? The answer can be found by looking at the conditions necessary for the effective deployment of soft power.

Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the postcommunist region has experienced the establishment of a rough-and-tumble marketplace of ideas. In countries that later experienced electoral revolutions, some restrictions on political parties were lifted, independent media outlets operated more freely, and civil society organizations flourished after the fall of communism. For example, scholars have characterized the Georgian media as "relatively open."⁷⁸ The Ukrainian government wielded tight control over formal media outlets, but they allowed the operation of several leading NGOs formed expressly to advance the cause of democratic development.⁷⁹ Civil society groups such as *Pora* were able to communicate their ideas throughout the country using political and social analysis, broad-based mobilization, and citizen participation.⁸⁰ They shrewdly focused on the dissemination of pro-democracy information and communication—areas ripe for public consumption given the sterile state media and closed political channels. As time went on, these groups used their energy and financial resources to find other ways to provide voter information and education. *Pora* and other vigorous civil society groups in Ukraine are emblematic of the types of ideational marketplaces that were allowed to flourish in the postcommunist region.

The conditions for persuasion were also present in that the senders of the democracy-promotion messages were perceived as credible by the target audience. The U.S. hand was largely hidden in this soft power campaign and the United States worked indirectly through local pro-democracy groups on the ground. Particularly important in these local groups were the graduates from previous electoral revolutions.⁸¹ These former members of the democratic opposition in other revolutions had experience in toppling dictators, giving their message enormous credibility to the local populations intent on repeating those achievements in their own countries. Beyond their expertise, the graduates were also seen as trustworthy by the target audience. Unlike some of the local democratic opposition that stood to gain political power, or the United States that stood to gain geopolitical influence from a successful democratic transition, the international graduates were perceived as being motivated by democratic ideals.

Democracy promotion strategies were also conducive to soft power strategies because of the important role of attitudes, unimpeded by countervailing material factors, in the democratic transitions. Students of democratization frequently point to ideas and culture to

explain crossnational patterns of democratization.⁸² In democratic transitions (as opposed to democratic consolidation), the ideas of elites are thought to take on an even greater causal importance.⁸³ In the particular case of the electoral revolutions, scholars have identified an innovative set of strategic ideas that allowed democratic opposition groups to succeed in overthrowing the previous political order—“the electoral model of regime change.”⁸⁴ This model of regime change contains standard and interchangeable parts that include: the formation of a unified opposition, the utilization of international election monitoring, and preparations for public protests if the authoritarian incumbents attempt to steal the election.⁸⁵

This electoral model diffused throughout the postcommunist world as the graduates of previous transitions, funded by American and international democracy promotion campaigns, taught it to democratic opposition groups in other countries. The American soft power campaign succeeded in identifying the international and domestic actors that shared U.S. goals and in enhancing their effectiveness by linking them with more experienced counterparts from countries that had successfully undergone democratic transitions.

The structural and material factors that were in place in the postcommunist region did not clash with these ideas, but helped to facilitate democratic transitions. These factors include: the lack of politicized militaries, historical experience with (largely fraudulent) elections, highly educated populations, and the potential rewards of EU membership.⁸⁶

One may question whether successful U.S. efforts were more the result of hard power, rather than soft power, as we claim. While the United States clearly provided material support to pro-democracy groups, the democratic transitions in these cases are better characterized as resulting from soft power, as we define it. By facilitating interaction between the graduates of previous democratic openings and antiregime forces, the United States helped to disseminate a set of ideas about how to pry a democratic opening out of a fraudulent election. The electoral model of regime change diffused by U.S. democracy promotion efforts bolstered the effectiveness of antiregime forces and loosened authoritarian governments' grip on power without directly altering the material costs and benefits of either set of actors.

Finally, one could question whether these electoral revolutions should really be considered cases of success, given the extent of democratic backsliding in some of these countries subsequent to the democratic openings. Certainly, U.S. democracy promoters would have preferred further democratic consolidation in these cases, but we employ a more modest measure of success—visible progress toward the stated goal of the soft power campaign. There is no doubt that the color revolutions exceed this more modest threshold. McFaul assesses that “Even if Ukrainian democracy does slide back toward autocracy over the long run, the Orange Revolution will still remain a dramatic case of democratic breakthrough, and may be the most important instance of democratic breakthrough in this decade.”⁸⁷

In sum, the U.S. effort to use soft power to spread democracy achieved some success in the postcommunist region. It is no coincidence that this environment was also conducive to the exercise of soft power. In the postcommunist region, a robust civil society sustained a free marketplace of ideas, the graduates of previous electoral revolutions were persuasive democratic messengers, and the idea of the electoral model of regime change was indispensable to the democratic transitions. Had any of these three conditions been absent, it is much less likely that the U.S. would have succeeded in using soft power to spread democracy in the postcommunist region.

Conclusion: How to Use Soft Power

In order to advance our understanding of soft power, this article developed a theory of governmental efforts to employ soft power that takes seriously the “power” part of the

equation. The question is, “What would it take for a government to be able to successfully employ a soft power strategy?” In this article, we have identified and explored the mechanisms by which soft power would take effect and have found that the environments in which soft power can work are restrictive. Only when there is a functioning marketplace of ideas, when a messenger and message are credible, and when individual attitudes can shape international politics does the application of soft power have a reasonable chance of success. We then explored these theoretical claims through analysis of three U.S. government efforts to employ soft power. The three soft power preconditions were present as the United States promoted democracy in the postcommunist region, leading to a series of electoral revolutions. We demonstrated that at least some of these conditions were absent in the Iraq War and the war on terror and, accordingly, the United States was unable to win hearts and minds in Iraq or to counter ideological support for terrorism (see Table 1).

Foreign policy actors have many reasons to experiment with soft power, not merely because its use can be less costly than hard power. But, soft power comes with its own quite striking limitations. Our research suggests that soft power strategies will be unlikely to succeed except under fairly restrictive conditions. It may very well be, then, that the U.S. foreign policy elite is at risk of exaggerating the effectiveness of soft power (rather than underutilizing it) as a tool of foreign policy. After all, international communication is fraught with difficulties, persuading people to change firmly held political views is hard, and individual attitudes are often thought to have an insignificant role in determining international political outcomes. Soft power, therefore, will probably be considered a niche foreign policy option useful for addressing a small fraction of the problems on Washington’s foreign policy agenda. Analysts who suggest that soft power can easily be substituted for hard power or who maintain that soft power should provide an overarching guide to the formulation of U.S. foreign policy are badly mistaken. It is not conducive to good policy to employ the idea of soft power as a way of arguing against the use of military force, for example.

Although there are serious constraints on the exercise of soft power, this research identifies the circumstances under which the application of soft power will most likely succeed. The United States can use soft power to its advantage when it seeks to reach a target audience in a society characterized by a functioning marketplace of ideas, that is receptive to communication and persuasion, and whose ideas are likely to shape international outcomes in a way that is favorable to U.S. interests.

Table 1
Taking Soft Power Seriously

Independent Variables	Cases		
	Iraq War	War on Terror	Democracy Promotion
Functioning marketplace of ideas	X		X
Persuasion conditions present			X
Attitudes likely to shape outcome		X	X
<i>All soft power conditions present</i>	<i>No</i>	<i>No</i>	<i>Yes</i>
Dependent Variable			
<i>Soft power success</i>	<i>No</i>	<i>No</i>	<i>Yes</i>

Two practical recommendations follow from this analysis. First, policymakers who want to deploy soft power as a first resort need to think about “shaping the battlefield” for soft power just as boldly as military strategists do before deploying hard power. The United States should seek to advance a functioning marketplace of ideas in societies in which such an environment does not currently exist. Washington is constrained in its ability to employ soft power in part because many of the most important audiences, from the point of view of U.S. foreign policy, are in closed societies. We saw, for example, that Washington was unable to counter ideological support for terrorism in part because it was unable to communicate to publics in the Middle East. By more forcefully advocating for open media and a reduction of government censorship in these countries, the United States can expand the range of situations in which it can effectively exercise soft power.

Second, when waging soft power campaigns, Washington should avoid direct communication and instead seek to transmit messages through intermediaries who are more trusted by target audiences. That is not a euphemism for propaganda. Soft power campaigns are most successful when the messenger is trusted by the target audience, but messengers promoting a message that advances their own self-interest are inherently perceived as less trustworthy. For example, we saw that the Iraqi population discounted Washington’s attempts to publicize the benefits of the U.S.-led occupation for Iraqi society. On the other hand, we saw that the graduates of electoral revolutions were able to more credibly disseminate Washington’s message about best practices for bringing down dictators to other postcommunist countries. Independent, third-party sources of messages, not beholden to U.S. interests, are perhaps the most valuable assets a soft power strategist can have.

The field of international relations often responds to real world problems. During the Cold War, much scholarship was devoted to understanding nuclear deterrence theory.⁸⁸ This development of theories of hard power helped to propel forward international relations theory, while simultaneously serving as a guide to the formation of U.S. policy. As of yet, there are no equally extensive and refined bodies of theory for soft power. But American foreign policy will always, and may increasingly, contain an important soft power component. At present, the United States finds itself in a battle for hearts and minds in multiple counterinsurgency campaigns, seeks to address rising tides of anti-American sentiment, and attempts to counter ideological support for terrorism. If the academic community wishes to inform these debates, it is imperative that scholars adopt an ambitious research agenda centered on answering critical questions about soft power.

Notes

1. Joseph S. Nye, Jr., *Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power* (New York: Basic Books, 1990).
2. Joseph S. Nye, Jr., *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics* (New York: Public Affairs, 2004), 5.
3. *Ibid.*, 6.
4. *Ibid.*, 11.
5. *Ibid.*
6. *Ibid.*, x.
7. See, for example: Nye, Jr., *Soft Power*; Joseph S. Nye, Jr., “Soft Power,” *Foreign Policy*, no. 80 (Autumn 1990): 153–171; Joseph S. Nye, Jr., “The Decline of America’s Soft Power,” *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 83, no. 3 (May/June 2004): 16–20; Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Jr., “Power and Interdependence in the Information Age,” *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 77, no. 5 (September/October 1998): 81–94; Joseph S. Nye, Jr., “US Power and Strategy After Iraq,” *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 82, no. 4 (July/August 2003): 60–73; Joseph S. Nye, Jr., “Soft Power and American Foreign Policy,” *Political*

Science Quarterly, vol. 119, no. 2 (July 2004): 255–270; Joseph S. Nye, Jr., “Propaganda Isn’t the Way,” *The International Herald Tribune*, January 10, 2003; Joseph S. Nye, Jr., “Ignoring Soft Power Has A High Cost,” *The Chicago Tribune*, May 16, 2004; Josef Joffe, “The Perils of Soft Power,” *New York Times Magazine*, May 14, 2006; Joshua Kurlantzick, “China’s Charm: Implications of Chinese Soft Power,” *Policy Brief Carnegie Endowment for International Peace*, June 2006; Kurt Campbell and Michael O’Hanlon, *Hard Power: The New Politics of National Security* (New York: Basic Books, 2006); David Edelstein and Ronald Krebs, “Washington’s Troubling Obsession with Public Diplomacy,” *Survival*, vol. 41, no. 1 (Spring 2005): 89–104; Joseph S. Nye, Jr., *The Paradox of American Power: Why the World’s Only Superpower Can’t Go it Alone* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002); Max Boot, *War Made New: Technology, Warfare, and the Course of History: 1500 to Today* (New York: Gotham, 2006); Thomas L. Ilgen, *Hard Power, Soft Power and the Future of Transatlantic Relations* (Hampshire: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2006); Zakir Hussain, “PM Lee ‘Uses Smart Power,’” *The Straits Times* (Singapore), December 2, 2006; Catherine Lim, “A Dash of Tolerance and a Big Helping of Smart Power,” *The Straits Times* (Singapore), December 7, 2006; Scott Atran, “Soft Power and the Psychology of Suicide Bombing,” *Terrorism Monitor*, vol. 2, no. 11 (June 2004): 1–4; “CSIS Commission on Smart Power: A Smarter, More Secure America,” *Center for Strategic and International Studies*, November 2007.

8. See, for example: Joffe, “Perils of Soft Power”; Kurlantzick, “China’s Charm”; Campbell and O’Hanlon, *Hard Power*; Edelstein and Krebs, “Washington’s Troubling Obsession”; Ilgen, *Hard Power, Soft Power*; Hussain, “PM Lee ‘Uses Smart Power’”; Lim, “Dash of Tolerance”; Atran, “Soft Power and the Psychology”; and “CSIS Commission on Smart Power.”

9. This definition draws on Robert Dahl’s widely used definition of power and is consistent with Nye’s original conceptualization of soft power, “getting others to want the outcomes that you want . . . through attraction rather than through coercion and payments” (*Soft Power*, 5–15). For Robert A. Dahl’s discussion of power, see “The Concept of Power,” *Behavioral Science*, vol. 2 (1957): 201–215. For other conceptualizations of power see Michael Barnett and Raymond Duvall, “Power in International Politics,” *International Organization*, vol. 59 (Winter 2005): 39–75; Steven Lukes, *Power: A Radical View* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005); David A. Baldwin, “Power Analysis and World Politics,” *World Politics*, vol. 31, no. 2 (January 1979): 161–194; and Morton Bachrach and Peter Baratz, *Power and Poverty: Theory and Practice* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1970).

10. Furthermore, many analysts advocating that states use more soft power appear to be arguing simply that states should adopt policies that are more attractive to an international audience. But it is difficult to see what, if anything, this has to do with power. States can adopt policies that are popular internationally without convincing another actor to do something that it otherwise would not do. In fact, to the degree that states compromise national goals in order to please international audiences, there is an inherent tension between the acquisition of soft power resources and the exercise of power.

11. Richard E. Petty and John T. Cacioppo, *Attitudes and Persuasion: Classic and Contemporary Approaches* (Dubuque: Wm. C. Brown Company Publishers, 1981), 7.

12. *Ibid.*, 4.

13. Social psychological theories of attitude change include the Hovland attitude change approach (which is used as the basis for the discussion of attitude change in this article), Carl Iver Hovland, Irving Lester Janis, and Harold H. Kelley, *Communication and Persuasion* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1953); cognitive dissonance theory, Leon Festinger, *A Theory of Cognitive Dissonance* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1957); attribution theory, Harold H. Kelley, “Attribution Theory in Social Psychology,” in David Levine, ed., *Nebraska Symposium on Motivation*, vol. 15 (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1967), 192–238; self-perception theory, Daryl J. Bem, “Self-Perception Theory,” in Leonard Berkowitz, ed., *Advances in Experimental Social Psychology*, vol. 6 (New York: Academic Press, 1972), 1–62; and schema theory, Shelley E. Taylor and Jennifer Crocker, “Schematic Bases of Social Information Processing,” in E. Tory Higgins, C. Peter Herman, and Mark P. Zanna, eds., *Social Cognition: The Ontario Symposium* (Hillsdale: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 1981), 89–134. For a concise overview of these schools of thought, see Deborah

Welch Larson, *Origins of Containment: A Psychological Explanation* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985), 24–65. For more recent treatments, see Dolores Albarracín, Blair T. Johnson, and Mark P. Zanna, eds., *The Handbook of Attitudes* (Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 2005); Gerd Bohner and Michaela Wanke, *Attitudes and Attitude Change* (New York: Psychology Press, 2002); and Timothy C. Brock and Melanie C. Green, eds., *Persuasion: Psychological Insights and Perspectives* (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 2005).

14. Here we focus on only some of the most important findings in this literature. Persuasiveness also depends, for example, on whether or not the targets are in a deliberative mode or processing information more reflexively, using heuristics. The other findings of the social psychology literature may also have application to soft power, but they are not explored here.

15. Hovland, Janis, and Kelley, *Communication and Persuasion*; Festinger, *Theory of Cognitive Dissonance*; Kelley, “Attribution Theory”; Bem, “Self-Perception Theory”; Taylor and Crocker, “Schematic Bases”; Welch Larson, *Origins of Containment*; Albarracín, Johnson, and Zanna, *Handbook of Attitudes*; Bohner and Wanke, *Attitudes and Attitude Change*; Brock and Green, *Persuasion*.

16. Hovland, Janis, and Kelley, *Communication and Persuasion*; Festinger, *Theory of Cognitive Dissonance*; Kelley, “Attribution Theory”; Bem, “Self-Perception Theory”; Taylor and Crocker, “Schematic Bases”; Welch Larson, *Origins of Containment*; Albarracín, Johnson, and Zanna, *Handbook of Attitudes*; Bohner and Wanke, *Attitudes and Attitude Change*; Brock and Green, *Persuasion*.

17. Hovland, Janis, and Kelley, *Communication and Persuasion*; Festinger, *Theory of Cognitive Dissonance*; Kelley, “Attribution Theory”; Bem, “Self-Perception Theory”; Taylor and Crocker, “Schematic Bases”; Welch Larson, *Origins of Containment*; Albarracín, Johnson, and Zanna, *Handbook of Attitudes*; Bohner and Wanke, *Attitudes and Attitude Change*; Brock and Green, *Persuasion*.

18. Alice H. Eagly et al., “What is Beautiful is Good, but . . . : A Meta-Analytic Review of Research on the Physical Attractiveness Stereotype,” *Psychological Bulletin*, vol. 110, no. 1 (1991): 109–128.

19. Ibid.

20. Petty and Cacioppo, *Attitudes and Persuasion*.

21. Richard L. Miller, “Mere Exposure, Psychological Reactance, and Attitude Change,” *Public Opinion Quarterly*, vol. 40 (1976): 229–233.

22. Irving L. Janis and Seymour Feshbach, “Effects of Fear-Arousing Communication,” *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, vol. 48 (1953): 78–92.

23. Miriam Zellner, “Self-Esteem, Reception, and Influenceability,” *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, vol. 15 (1970): 87–93.

24. Richard E. Petty et al., “Positive Mood and Persuasion: Different Roles for Affect Under High- and Low-Elaboration Conditions,” *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, vol. 64, no. 1 (1993): 5–20.

25. Irving L. Janis, Donald Kaye, and Paul Kirschner, “Facilitating Effects of ‘Eating-While-Reading’ on Responsiveness to Persuasive Communication,” *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, vol. 1 (1965): 181–186.

26. See for example, Kenneth N. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (New York: McGraw Hill, 1979) and John J. Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics* (New York: W.W. Norton, 2003). For a competing perspective that gives individual attitudes more causal weight in explaining international outcomes, see, for example, Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, “International Norm Dynamics and Political Change,” *International Organization*, vol. 52, no. 4 (1998): 887–917.

27. On U.S. soft power campaigns in these three issue areas see, for example, Alexander T. J. Lennon, *The Battle for Hearts and Minds: Using Soft Power to Undermine Terrorist Networks* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2003); Alexandra Silver, “Soft Power: Democracy Promotion and U.S. NGOs,” *Council on Foreign Relations Background* (March 2007), available from http://www.cfr.org/publication/10164/soft_power.html; and Carnes Lord, *Losing Hearts and Minds? Public Diplomacy and Strategic Influence in the Age of Terror* (Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2006).

28. Rick Atkinson, "Iraq Will Be Petraeus's Knot to Untie: General Known to See Peace as Still Possible," *Washington Post*, January 7, 2007, p. A1; Department of the Army, *Counterinsurgency Field Manual No. 3-24*, December 2006, available from <http://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/army/fm3-24.pdf>.
29. Jeff Gerth and Scott Shane, "U.S. Is Said to Pay to Plant Articles in Iraqi Papers," *New York Times*, December 1, 2005.
30. Michael R. Gordon, "Military Hones a New Strategy in Iraq," *New York Times*, October 4, 2006.
31. Steven Kull, "Iraqi Public Opinion on the Presence of U.S. Troops," Testimony Before House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on International Organizations, Human Rights, and Oversight, July 23, 2008, available from <http://www.worldpublicopinion.org/pipa/articles/brmiddleeastnafricara/517.php?lb=brme&pnt=517&nid=&id=>.
32. World Public Opinion.org, "Baghdad Shias Believe Killings May Increase Once U.S.-led Forces Depart But Large Majorities Still Support Withdrawal Within a Year," *Program on International Policy Attitudes*, November 20, 2006, available at http://www.worldpublicopinion.org/pipa/articles/home_page/275.php?nid=&id=&pnt=275&lb=hmpg1.
33. International Republican Institute, "Survey of Iraqi Public Opinion: June 14–June 24, 2006," July 18, 2006, available from <http://www.iri.org/>.
34. Kull, "Iraqi Public Opinion."
35. There are contending answers to this question; our purpose here is not necessarily to take sides in this debate but to use the evidence from it to evaluate a theory of soft power. For other answers to this question see, for example: Dr. Samer S. Shehata, House Subcommittee on National Security, *Prepared Testimony on Iraq: Winning Hearts and Minds*, June 15, 2004, available from http://ccas.georgetown.edu/files/Shehata_Testimony.pdf; and Lord, *Losing Hearts and Minds?*.
36. BBC News, "Country Profile: Iraq," [updated January 22, 2007; cited April 21, 2007], available from http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/country_profiles/791014.stm.
37. *Ibid.*
38. *Ibid.*
39. See, for example, Jennifer Loven, "Bush Speaks to Iraq Leaders Amid Violence," *Associated Press Reports*, February 25, 2006.
40. See, for example, Dexter Filkins, "Where Plan A Left Ahmad Chalabi," *The New York Times Magazine*, November 5, 2006, p. 46.
41. See, for example: Christine Ollivier, "Chirac Says U.S. Led Invasion of Iraq Allowed Terrorism to Spread," *Associated Press*, January 6, 2007; Osama bin Laden, taped speech released on February 11, 2003, available from <http://www.cnn.com/interactive/world/0302/timeline.bin.laden.audio/frameset.exclude.html>; Michael Rowland, "Camera Turns on Michael Moore," *ABC Transcripts Australia*, March 14, 2007.
42. Rajiv Chandrasekaran, "An Educator Learns the Hard Way," *Washington Post*, June 21, 2004, p. A1.
43. Jeff Gerth, "Military's Information War is Vast and Often Secretive," *New York Times*, December 11, 2005.
44. David Edelstein, *Occupational Hazards: Success and Failure in Military Occupation* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2007).
45. World Public Opinion.org, "Most Iraqis Want U.S. Troops Out."
46. *Ibid.*
47. David Edelstein, "Occupational Hazards: Why Military Occupations Succeed or Fail," *International Security*, vol. 29, no. 4 (Summer 2004): 49–91.
48. Department of Defense, *The National Defense Strategy of the United States of America*, March 2005, available from <http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Apr2005/d20050408strategy.pdf>.
49. *Ibid.*, 11.
50. *Ibid.*
51. The White House, *National Strategy for Combating Terrorism*, September 2006, p. 1, available from <http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nsct/2006/>.

52. Defense Science Board, *Task Force on Strategic Communication*, September 2004, p. 3, available from <http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/dod/dsb/commun.pdf>.

53. Karen P. Hughes, "Testimony before the House Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs," April 19, 2007, available from <http://usinfo.state.gov/xarchives/display.html?p=texttrans-english&y=2007&m=April&x=20070419190631xjsnommis0.8693048>.

54. Todd Moss, David Roodman, and Scott Standley, "The Global War on Terror and U.S. Development Assistance: USAID Allocation by Country: 1998–2005," *Center for Global Development Working Paper*, no. 62 (July 2005).

55. Shehata, House Subcommittee on National Security, *Prepared Testimony*.

56. Walter Pincus, "U.S. Working to Reshape Iraqi Detainees: Moderate Muslims Enlisted to Steer Adults and Children Away from Insurgency," *Washington Post*, September 19, 2007, p. A1.

57. See, for example: Aidan Lewis, "Death Toll in Algeria Bombings Hits 33," *Associated Press*, April 12, 2007; Julia Preston, "Victims of Bombings in Israel Seek Damages in New York," *The New York Times*, January 7, 2006, p. B3; "Roadside Bombings in Iraq Kill Two Security Forces, Wound at Least 12," *Associated Press*, April 6, 2006; "Putin Meets Beslan Mothers in Delicate Balancing Act," *Agence France Presse*, September 2, 2005; Associated Press, "Jordanian Victims Honored," *The Houston Chronicle*, November 11, 2005, p. B5; "London Bombings Relief Fund," *The Evening Standard* (London), July 14, 2005; Marina de Russe, "Spanish Terror Victims Decry Politicisation of Their Cause," *Agence France Presse*, June 9, 2006.

58. Evan F. Kohlman, "The Real Online Terrorist Threat," *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 85, no. 5 (September/October 2006): 115–124; Steve Berriman, "Internet Spreading Dangerous Ideology," *CBS News*, February 1, 2007.

59. Mohammed el-Nawawy, "U.S. Public Diplomacy in the Arab World: The News Credibility of Radio Sawa and Television Alhurra in Five Countries," *Global Media and Communication*, vol. 2, no. 2 (2006): 183–203.

60. Ibid.

61. Ibid.

62. The White House, *National Strategy for Combating Terrorism*, 10.

63. M. Steven Fish, "Islam and Authoritarianism," *World Politics*, vol. 55, no. 1 (October 2002): 4–37.

64. "Bloggers May Be the Real Opposition," *The Economist*, April 12, 2007.

65. See, for example, Jack Beatty, "The Real Roots of Terror," *The Atlantic Monthly*, December 5, 2001.

66. Ibid.

67. See, for example, Jefferson Morley, "Amman Bombing: Spinning a Conspiracy Theory," *Washington Post*, November 15, 2005; Daniel Pipes, *The Hidden Hand: Middle East Fears of Conspiracy* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1996).

68. Giacomo Chiozza, "Disaggregating Anti-Americanism," in Peter Katzenstein and Robert O. Keohane, eds., *Anti-Americanism in World Politics* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2006), 93–126.

69. Nathan Guttman, "Good Morning Baghdad, This is Washington Calling," *Haaretz* (2004), available from <http://www.haaretzdaily.com/hasen/pages/ShArt.jhtml?itemNo=219301>.

70. Defense Science Board, *Task Force on Strategic Communication*, 48–59.

71. Cited in el-Nawawy, "U.S. Public Diplomacy in the Arab World," 189.

72. See, for example: Mia Bloom, *Dying to Kill: The Allure of Suicide Terror* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005); Marc Sageman, *Understanding Terror Networks* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004); Robert Anthony Pape, *Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism* (New York: Random House, 2005); Ethan Bueno de Mesquita, "The Quality of Terror," *American Journal of Political Science*, vol. 49, no. 3 (July 2005): 515–530; Jerrold M. Post, *The Mind of the Terrorist: The Psychology of Terrorism from the IRA to Al Qaeda* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007); Rex A. Hudson and Marilyn Lundell Majeska, "The Sociology and Psychology of Terrorism: Who Becomes a Terrorist and Why?," ed. Federal Research Division (Washington, DC:

The Division, 1999); and Jeff Victoroff, "The Mind of the Terrorist," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, vol. 49, no. 1 (2005): 3–42.

73. Valerie Bunce and Sharon L. Wolchik, "Favorable Conditions and Electoral Revolutions," *Journal of Democracy*, vol. 17, no. 4 (2006): 5–18, 12.

74. *Ibid.*, 7.

75. See, for example: Graeme Herd, "Colorful Revolutions and the CIS," *Problems of Post-communism*, vol. 52 (March–April 2005): 3–18; Bertil Nygren, "The Beauty and the Beast: When Electoral Democracy Hit Eurasia" (unpublished manuscript, 2005); Bertil Nygren, "Putin's Attempt to Subjugate Georgia: From Sabre Rattling to Purse Policy" (paper presented at ICSEES, Berlin, July 2005); Bunce and Wolchik, "Favorable Conditions"; Valerie Bunce and Sharon Wolchik, "International Diffusion and Postcommunist Electoral Revolution," *Communist and Post-Communist Studies*, vol. 39, no. 3 (September 2006): 283–304; Michael McFaul, "Transitions from Postcommunism," *Journal of Democracy*, vol. 16, no. 3 (2005): 5–19; Michael McFaul, "Ukraine Imports Democracy: External Influences on the Orange Revolution," *International Security*, vol. 32, no. 2 (Fall 2007): 45–83.

76. McFaul, "Ukraine Imports Democracy."

77. Bunce and Wolchik, "Favorable Conditions," 15; Andrew Wilson, *Ukraine's Orange Revolution* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2005), 187.

78. Bunce and Wolchik, "International Diffusion."

79. Wilson, *Ukraine's Orange Revolution*, 183–187.

80. Pavol Demes and Joerg Forbig, "Pora—'It's Time' for Democracy in Ukraine," in Anders Aslund and Michael McFaul, eds., *Revolution in Orange: The Origins of Ukraine's Democratic Breakthrough* (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2006), 85–102.

81. Bunce and Wolchik, "Favorable Conditions"; Bunce and Wolchik, "International Diffusion."

82. For cultural approaches to democratization see, for example: Lucian W. Pye with Mary W. Pye, *Asian Power and Politics: The Cultural Dimensions of Authority* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1985); Robert D. Putnam, *Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2000); and Robert D. Putnam, *Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993).

83. Guillermo O'Donnell, Philippe C. Schmitter, and Laurence Whitehead, eds., *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Prospects for Democracy* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986); Giuseppe Di Palma, *To Craft Democracies: An Essay on Democratic Transitions* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990).

84. Bunce and Wolchik, "International Diffusion," 6.

85. Bunce and Wolchik, "Favorable Conditions," 6.

86. *Ibid.*

87. *Ibid.*

88. See, for example, Bernard Brodie, *The Absolute Weapon: Atomic Power and World Order* (New York: Harcourt, Brace, and Company, 1946); Thomas C. Schelling, *The Strategy of Conflict* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1980); Thomas C. Schelling, *Arms and Influence* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1967); Robert Jervis, *The Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution: Statecraft and the Prospect of Armageddon* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1989).